The African Development Bank (AfDB) Group is the
premier development finance institution in Africa. Its mandate is "to
contribute to the sustainable economic development and social progress of its
regional members". Poverty
reduction and development are central to its mission. The importance of energy
in achieving these goals cannot be overstated.
Under the New Deal, the Bank has committed to
invest US$12 billion between 2016 and 2020. It expects to leverage a further
US$45–50 billion in co-financing for energy projects over the period. To
optimise on these investments, the recipients of this funding will need to mitigate
project delays and cost overruns. The best way to do this, is to look at the
past - the data. At Senca, we specialise in assisting
organisations in making data-driven decisions on their projects at the
planning phase. To that end, below we present the key findings from our
analysis of 30 years of AFDB grid extension project completion reports. The goal being
to assist African governments in their preparation of AFDB bids and planning of grid extension projects.
The AFDB's involvement in grid extension projects is clearly valuable. Conclusions not included in the Explore analysis:
- 88% of the projects in the analysis were rated satisfactory or higher
- AFDB funded grid extension projects regularly overachieve on their targets with regards to households connected
Intro to Senca Explore
Senca Explore empowers organisations to convert the text from your project reports into useful data points so you can easily see what has and what hasn't worked on your projects. It's an intuitive interface - just click the data block you are interested in and more information appears below it. When a block turns grey, it means that block has been selected.
Below is a summary of the project results. Clicking on the coloured blocks allows you to dig deeper into the data.
Below are the factors that allowed projects to save money during implementation. Clicking on the coloured blocks allows you to dig deeper into the data.
The implementing agency (TANESCO) chose a training consultant and training location that prevented the project from completing 2/3 of its intended training activities, resulting in cost savings. No further details were provided in the report.
Cost savings were realized on completion of the project from both sides - Ethiopia and Djibouti. As a result some of the funds were not disbursed. No further details were provided as to how this was achieved.
The local implementing agency (TANESCO) used its construction teams for both supervision and construction, and local contractors were used more than initially envisaged, resulting in cost savings.
In the course of the project implementation, some modifications were effected in respect of design specification, which were approved by the Bank. These modifications related to the following: i) changes in transformer windings and transformer ratings; ii) changes in voltage levels and in the design as well as construction of sub-stations; iii) reduction in the number of substations constructed; iv) extension of the length of overhead lines; and of the number of substations constructed; (v) type and number of tools supplied; (vi) number of trucks supplied; and vii) reduction in the number of man months for training.
The Consultant, in accordance with the Terms of Reference, reviewed the project design between 12 January and 15 April 1994 and proposed several modifications to it. The design of the project, as done by the executing agency, was not the least cost one. The Consultant optimised the design by considering various conductor and tower structure configurations to arrive at the least cost solution. The optimised design was utilised in the preparation of the bidding documents.
The project experienced high competition in the framework of the works contract and change in the mode of acquisition for the monitoring and supervision of the works enabled savings to be made on that contract and by extension, the overall project costs.
On completion, the total project cost amounted to 88% of the appraisal estimate, resulting in substantial cost savings. The savings are mainly due to low contract prices offered as a result of competitive biddings.
Local enterprises bidding for the execution component of the project were found to be very competitive. It should be noted that a large part of the projects savings were the result of bad project accounting practices on the part of the local implementing agency (ONE).
All packages were tendered in accordance with international competitive bidding (ICB). There was keen competition and submission of cost effective competitive offers by the bidders.
The devaluation of the Dinar to the UA (Unit of Account) during project implementation, further decreased the cost of local contractors, on top of the savings that had been generated from their initial competitive bids. It should be noted that a large part of the projects savings were the result of bad project accounting practices on the part of the local implementing agency (ONE). ONE financed a project component through its own annual budget and the cost could not be reconciled as ONE did not keep separate project accounts.
Below are the factors that caused projects to run over budget. Clicking on the coloured blocks allows you to dig deeper into the data.
The project ended up requiring more infrastructure than initially envisaged. This was due primarily to the fact that between the prospection studies, engineering designs and engineering designs of a given village, the time lapse varied from 2 to 7 years during which, people around the village learnt about STEG's (the implementing agency) intention to electrify that village. As such, they chose to settle around the village, building a rural dwelling. This rural dwelling concentration phenomenon explains why under the project, there were more consumers to connect, more MV and LV lines to build and additional MV and LV transformer posts to install.
Following the completion of the Transmission Network Development study by an international consultant, a modified and much larger set of transmission lines and substations was identified to fully utilize the additional 500 MW power supply Zimbabwe was likely to get by interconnection from Mozambique. Some of the transmission lines previously identified would have become redundant after the above connection was made. It became evident that the Initial bank loan was insufficient for the revised scope of the transmission system.
The major modifications on the project involved a sharp increase in the quantity of structures and installations. For instance, the number of LV connections increased by 52%, compared to the estimate at appraisal. Whilst the project was certainly over budget, it should be noted that this was by design, as an opportunity presented it itself for the project to achieve more than it had initially set out to. These overruns allowed for more customers to be connected to the grid and the overrun was fully paid for by the Government and STEG (the executing agency).
The project did not undergo any technical modifications in relation to the initial design. However, the lengths of the MV and LV lines and the number of MV and LV sub-stations largely exceeded the estimates made at appraisal. The lengths of the MV and LV lines and the number of MV/LV sub-stations constructed practically doubled in relation to the estimates made at appraisal because the villages and rural accommodations connected under the project were in large part isolated, scattered and distant from the existing electrical network.
Almost three-quarters of the increase in costs were attributed to the depreciation, of the Tunisian currency in relation to the American dollar, which was adopted as the benchmark currency in the loan agreement. The rest was due to the increase in the number of LV connections, as well as that of associated installations, namely, MV, LV and MV/LV transformer plants. At project completion in June 2005, the objective of LV connections had been attained, and even exceeded, by about 7 % since 52,738 connections had been made as against 45,320 anticipated. The increase in the number of rural subscribers over the project duration, which was about 5 % a year, was considerably higher than that of the rural population (estimates available only for 1999-2003, of 1.9 % a year on average).
4/5 of the project components exceeded their initial budget. The project completion report makes no effort to explain why this was case. It may rise from the nature of the project, as the PCR notes:
"Since the project is derived from a programme to rehabilitate and upgrade the distribution network, it would be
more useful not to circumscribe in advance the project rehabilitation activities to be financed by the loan since they form part of
normal company operations and can therefore vary at any time.
In this type of project involving the rehabilitation of electricity distribution network, the loan granted to the Borrower
should be used for the purpose stated. An initial list of activities to be undertaken could be decided at project appraisal.
The list can then be periodically reviewed and approved by the Bank depending on priority needs. An assessment at the
end of the project will also include an ex-post evaluation of the quantities of structures constructed and proper use of the
amounts disbursed."
The project made three major modifications due to inaccurate studies that increased project costs: the first was the
change of the section of the connecting cable from N’Dali to Parakou. Initially planned to be
in 75.5 mm cable, this 33 kV line was in 148.1 mm cable. By this modification, SBEE plans
to use it as a main line for major power transit that will help interconnect the localities in the
North-east of Benin. The second modification concerns the digging of special foundations needed to
cross certain areas prone to flooding. This helped get round the difficulties linked to the
transportation and installation of the concrete poles in the flood-prone areas. The third modification concerned the increase in the number of supports to
be installed on the MV lines ‘long spans’ in order to reduce the maximum span acceptable on
these lines, the substantial increase in anchor and angle supports on the MV and LV lines in
relation to the quantity estimated, as well as the utilisation of the remaining project material
for power supply to the additional localities crossed by the MV lines.
The number
of localities electrified increased by 65% in relation to estimates at appraisal, but the project cost
increased by only 12.17 %, thanks to the additional SBEE and Government budgets.
Funding was adequate and available for project implementation within the timeframe. However, too much optimism was placed on the implementation timeframe of the North Benin-North Togo interconnection (another project on which this project depended), from where 21 project localities were to be electrified using an overhead protection ground wire. Due to delay in building this facility, that option (retained at appraisal) was abandoned for the classic but more costly technical solution of constructing medium voltage lines (20-33 kV), hence the additional costs. The main risks were identified and factored into the project design, as were the mitigation measures. However, risks linked to SBEE’s inability to deliver RCPs in sufficient quantities and on time, and the delay in the construction of the North Benin- North Togo interconnection line were not sufficiently taken into account in project design. The report states: "During design of projects whose implementation depends on another project, the Borrower and the Bank must provide sufficient guarantees in the latter’s implementation timeframe, to avoid resorting to less economic alternative solutions."
The project as initially approved by the Bank was considerably modified during the implementation phase. Contrary to appraisal provisions, it was implemented by a contracting firm and not on force account by the executing agency, with attendant significant financial impact. The appraisal did not take into account the costs and risks of having a third party implement the project. Since the component was financed by another donor, the correct procedures for recruiting the contracting firm, processing the bidding dossiers and awarding the contract were not submitted to the Bank for approval. A flat rate was charged on a portion of the rehabilitation works, while unit costs were applied on the other portion, resulting in an increase in the project implementation cost (one of the reasons for cost overrun on the estimated budget envelop and the suspension of certain works). Furthermore, following site demobilization, the contracting firm appropriated equipment even though these were included in the general contract amount. Project implementation was fraught with such irregularities as the transfer of some of the equipment to a private company and part-usage of same for purposes not initially planned and without ADB’s prior authorization. Moreover, the project implementation component was inadequately financed, as a result of which the contractor demobilized before the end of the scheduled period, with the attendant negative impact on general project implementation.
At completion, the total cost of the project was estimated at TND 119.23 million as against 100.10 at appraisal, i.e., a 19.11 % increase. The overrun of almost 19 % caused by the excess was fully covered by STEG and the beneficiaries. Almost three-quarters of the increase in costs were attributed to the depreciation, over the past six years, of the Tunisian currency in relation to the American dollar, which was adopted as the benchmark currency in the loan agreement.
The project was not favoured by the exchange rate fluctuations. The loan was denominated in UA (unit of account) which, at appraisal, was equal to CFAF 904.374 and dropped to CFAF 788.808 at the preparation of the project completion report, with a lot of fluctuations during disbursements, whereas the contracts were denominated in Euro and CFAF.
4 out of 7 of the project components registered a cost overrun of over 20%. This difference is not due to a price escalation but rather to the fluctuation of the UA exchange rate as compared with the Tunisian dinar.
Below are the factors that allowed projects to launch on time. Clicking on the coloured blocks allows you to dig deeper into the data.
The loan agreement was signed on 28 April 1989 and became effective on 30 September 1989, four months later, denoting quite a satisfactory performance. The conditions themselves were relatively relaxed compared to those of other projects.
The loan agreement was signed on 11 June 1999. The condition precedent to effectiveness of the Agreement related to the fulfillment of the conditions at Section 5.01 of the General Conditions applicable to Loan agreements and Guarantee agreements of the Bank. This condition was fulfilled and the loan agreement became effective on 28 December 1999, within the 6-month deadline required by the Bank.
The project started up even before the Bank’s appraisal. To facilitate the smooth running of the activities, Section 2.03. b) of the agreement stipulated that: In the application of the measures under Section 6.01 paragraph (b) of the General Conditions, expenditures relating to the Project works committed in 1999 and carried out after the approval of the Loan Agreement by the Board of Directors of the Bank shall be financed with the Loan resources in the amount of a maximum USD 1.4 million. This provision avoids possible delays in the acquisition of the components financed by the Bank - a savvy planning decision.
Whilst the government of Tunisia took nearly a year to fulfill the conditions for the loan to become effective, this did not delay the project's launch. This is because the project had made significant progress on preparation of engineering designs and the invitations to bid whilst the loan conditions were being met.
Below are the factors that caused projects to launch behind schedule. Clicking on the coloured blocks allows you to dig deeper into the data.
The loan entered into force 19 months after the signing of the loan agreement - primarily due to the delay in fulfilling the precedent conditions, especially approval of the institutional reform, including State divestiture from direct management of the sector. The donors forced the privatization process by making it a project conditionality. However, they did not analyze the risks inherent in sharing responsibilities with the new institutional framework that they wanted to put in place. The complexity of the much needed reform required more time than was initially scheduled.
The loan agreement for this project was signed on 24 October 1984, that is four months of the approval of the loan by the board. However it took 21 months after the signing of the agreement to enter into force. This was due to the administrative delays at the national level, including the period of ratification by the government and the difficulties encountered in fulfilling the conditions for effectiveness particularly those relating to the list of goods and services. No further details were given on why the list of goods and services was delayed.
The loan became effective 2 years and 6 months after loan agreement signature. These long delays are mainly due to difficulties encountered by the Borrower in meeting the loan conditions concerning the introduction of an electricity supply lines policy and the loan arrears recovery plan (recovery of arrears owed by the Government to the utility). After a long delay, these conditions were met. The report does not provide an explanation for the delay.
The Bank undertook launching mission immediately after the loan approval to assist Borrower/Executing Agency on the fulfillment of the loan conditions and start-up of the project implementation. In spite of these efforts, the front-end activities (fulfillment of Conditions Precedent of the loan and recruitment of Engineering Consultant) were not implemented as planned at appraisal and therefore delayed the start up of project implementation. The loan was declared effective in April 1998 as opposed to June 1997 (10 months delay). The implementation delay in turn resulted in payment of more commitment charges to the Bank and a delay in the realization of the benefits of the project. The conditions primarily related to improving the utility's financial health and organisational effectiveness.
The effective date of the loan was subjected to seven pre-conditions on initial disbursement, and was set at 30 May 1997, i.e. 36 months after signature. This delay is explained mainly by the difficulties encountered by the Borrower in meeting both condition N° (iii), ‘to provide proof that the funding of the implementation of the investments for the increase of at least 3 MW of power installed at Sao Tome’ has been obtained and condition N° (iv), ‘to provide proof that the necessary resources for financing the third party management contract has been obtained for the period from June 1994 to December 1996’. This last condition was changed and the loan agreement was subsequently modified. The initial modifications to the project were made owing to the difficulties encountered by the Borrower in pursuing the financing of the third party management contract after the French Development Fund had halted its portion of the project's financing.
The project was co-financed by the African Development Fund (ADF), the Nigerian Trust Fund (NTF), the Nordic Development Fund (NDF) and the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). The ADB loan could not become effective because part of the conditions was that co-financing for the construction of the 316 km 220kV line from Singida to Arusha to be financed by DANIDA had to be secured. It took time for this condition to be met. Closer donor coordination and synchronisation of activities could have reduced this delay in loan effectiveness and the Bank should therefore bear part of the responsibility for this. The cross effectiveness clause in the Bank Group Loans led to a delay of 32 months,
The loan agreement for this project was signed on 24 October 1984, that is four months of the approval of the loan by the board. However it took 21 months after the signing of the agreement to enter into force. This was due to the administrative delays at the national level, including the period of ratification by the government and the difficulties encountered in fulfilling the conditions for effectiveness particularly those relating to the list of goods and services. No further details were given on why the ratification process was delayed.
The first disbursement for the project took place in April 2005, which is about 16 months following the loan approval. This was mainly due to the time taken to sign the loan agreement (over 9 months) and the long delays in approving the first bidding documents and bid evaluation reports. This was because the entities responsible for project implementation were not sufficiently conversant, at the project launching, with the relevant Bank documents.
The loan entered into force on 01 September 2001, i.e. 13 months after the signing of the loan agreement. The delays in the implementation of loan agreements are mainly due to the excessively long time in ratifying loan agreements. In effect, in Benin, the National Assembly holds two parliamentary sessions per annum with agenda items fixed in advance. If the law authorising the ratification of a loan agreement is not promulgated, it would then have to wait until the next session unless an extraordinary parliamentary session is convened.
The loan agreement was executed between the Bank and the Borrower on April 14, 1993 (4 months after the loan approval). However, the loans were not declared effective, as the Borrower did not fulfill some of the conditions within the specified time. The main delay was due to non-submission of the subsidiary loan agreement (from the government to the executing agency). The loan agreement incorporating the comments of the Bank was submitted on 28 October 1993. The Bank declared the loans effective on 23 November 1993. It took about 11 months for the loans to become effective. The delay in loans’ effectiveness was the major cause of late commencement of the project.
The Borrower took 9-months to fulfill the conditions for loan effectiveness. This was primarily due to the length of time it took to the borrower to submit a legal opinion. An overall delay of 17-months was experienced between loan approval and effectiveness. No further details on the cause of the delay were given in the report.
At appraisal, it was envisaged that the project would start in January 1994. The project took off only in early 1998. The delay in take-off was attributed to the deadline for the entry into force of the loan (3 years) and of recruitment (1 year) of the Implementation Unit. More details on the former can be found in the "Delays in fulfilling conditions for loan effectiveness" section, however details on why the recruitment process was so heavily delayed were not provided in the documentation.
The Bank undertook launching mission immediately after the loan approval to assist Borrower/Executing Agency on the fulfillment of the loan conditions and start-up of the project implementation. In spite of these efforts, the front-end activities (fulfillment of Conditions Precedent of the loan and recruitment of Engineering Consultant) were not implemented as planned at appraisal and therefore delayed the start up of project implementation. The project implementation started with appointment of the Engineering Consultant in July 1998 as opposed to November 1997 envisaged at appraisal (8 months delay). The appointment of the Engineering Consultant was delayed mainly due to the long time taken in fulfilling the ‘Conditions Precedent’. Although the contract for the appointment of the Engineering Consultant was negotiated in August 1997, the contract could not come into force until the Advance Payment was made in July 1998 following effectiveness of the loan in April 1998.
At appraisal, the project was to be implemented over a period of 33 months effective from the start of the engineering consultant’s services, i.e. from January 2001 to July 2003 and the physical implementation of the works was to stretch over a period of 13 months, i.e. from July 2001 to July 2002. The invitation to bid for the recruitment of the engineering consultant was launched on 10 October 2001. Bid analysis and evaluation, as well as contract award was carried out in the first half of December 2001. The Bank’s non-objection notice was given on 15 January 2002 and the contract was signed on 05 July 2002. The signing process of this contract will have taken 6 months in all, which the Bank considered unsatisfactory. This delay was caused by two factors, a delay in response from the Bank to the initial temporary contract award due to the Bank's temporary relocation in Tunis; and secondly, when the Bank did respond - the Bank considered that the bid analysis and the contract award did not conform to its rules of procedure and requested the executing agency to start them all over again. Furthermore, under a supervision mission on 25 May 2003, training was organised by a PPRU expert on the Bank’s procurement rules and procedures. Thus, the bid analysis was repeated from 28 May to 6 June 2003 and the new award proposal was submitted to the Bank on 16 June 2003. This proposal was again submitted to PPRU for evaluation on 25 June 2003 and the Bank issued its non-objection notice for contract negotiations on 30 June 2003.
One of the major weaknesses noted in the project report was a "slowness in setting up the Implementation Unit". The organs set up under the first electrification project for 17 rural centres (the Monitoring Committee and the Implementation Unit established within SBEE) were retained for this project. The Implementation Unit was strengthened and attached directly to SBEE’s General Management for greater efficiency. Training on the Bank’s procurement and disbursement rules and procedures was organized for members of the Unit during Bank launching and supervision missions. The technical assistance of a consulting engineering firm was enlisted to support the Unit in procurement readiness, validation of technical studies, works control and supervision. However, the engineering consultant was recruited in June 2005 (10 months late). The consultant’s services involved: (i) updating and validating bidding documents on existing studies; (ii) procurement; (iii) acceptance of equipment in factories and on sites; and (iv) supervision of works and administrative monitoring of contracts.
Below are the factors that allowed projects to finish on schedule. Clicking on the coloured blocks allows you to dig deeper into the data.
The extremely satisfactory conduct of the project works and sound functioning of equipment are attributed STEG’s expertise and operational execution. STEG provided all the services for the engineering studies, preparation of tender documents, inspection and supervision of works and hand-over and commissioning trials. The report notes that had STEG not carried out certain services such as connections, studies, inspection and supervision - a significant cost overrun had been predicted. From a technical design standpoint, the project’s realization has shown STEG’s expertise in the technology of monophase medium voltage electricity distribution. The quality of the structures put in place and the very good technical operational results of the project are indicators that STEG technical personnel have largely mastered all aspects relating to design, planing, construction and operation of a monophase medium voltage distribution network.
Connection works were carried out exclusively by STEG teams. STEG was also responsible for engineering designs, preparation of bidding documents, as well as works inspection and supervision. These services were carried out in a decentralized way by the studies and works department of the various districts concerned.
From a technical design perspective, the project's implementation shows that STEG is perfectly in control of the single phase medium voltage electric supply technology. The quality of structures built and the very good technical operating results obtained by the project demonstrate STEG's technical staff’s proficiency
of all aspects of design, construction, operating and servicing of a single phase medium voltage supply network.
The supplies were acquired from manufacturers of distribution equipment. The orders were generally respected and the technical features of the equipment were in accordance with specifications. The works contracts were awarded on the basis of local contracts, where amounts involved exceeded 20,000 DT. Order for amounts below that threshold, were entrusted to companies selected by STEG (the executing agency) and with which it signed an annual call order contract. Annually, STEG invites tenders for minor MV and LV connection works and thereafter, on the basis of the offers received, it draws up a single price statement with unchangeable prices. The structures executed by third parties were in accordance with specification and all companies involved with works provided extremely satisfactory services.
Supply materials to be covered by the entire ADB package were procured through international competition in compliance with ADB procedures. Orders were made for STEG's annual requirements per type of supply material for better prices. The works contracts were awarded on the basis of local contracts, where amounts involved exceeded 20,000 DT. Order for amounts below that threshold, were entrusted to companies selected by STEG (the executing agency) and with which it signed an annual call order contract. Using their bids, STEG establishes a single priced bill of quantities with firm and and non-revisable unit prices. STEG has approved a number of local enterprises in each region and district with which it has signed an order contract renewable every year. In view of the works carried out, it seems that all enterprises provided very satisfactory services. Structures were built in accordance with specifications and norms applicable for the installation of the public electricity supply networks.
Below are the factors that caused delays during implementation/execution. Clicking on the coloured blocks allows you to dig deeper into the data.
The project components were completed in various stages between 1992 and 1996. There were delays in the completion of different components ranging from 2 to 5 years. The bank financed component was the last to be completed and the last of the transmission lines were completed in February 1996.
The implementation of the bank financed component was thus considerably delayed. The primary reason for the delay was due to the start-up/ launch delays and the delay in the finalisation of recommendations from the Transmission Systems Study and the subsequent revision of the projects scope. The study, completed by an international consultant, noted that a much larger set of transmission lines and substations were required to fully utilize the additional power the country was likely to get via interconnection to a power station in Mozambique. As a result, some of the transmission lines previously identified would have become redundant post the interconnection. The bank couldn't not approve the procurement until a revised list of goods and services was submitted and approved in March 1992 - approximately 4-years behind the implementation schedule.
There were two sets of delays. First was the delay in loan effectiveness, which meant that the project could not start early, while the second was during implementation i.e. after starting the project. The delay during implementation arose from the long time it took the Borrower/Executing Agency to undertake the procurements in compliance with the Bank rules, and from time overruns during actual construction. The total period of construction was 61 months, way above the appraisal estimate of 48 months. Delays during implementation would have been reduced had the Borrower been better appraised of the Bank’s procurement rules and procedures.
The analysis of the 24 months slippage on the project's implementation draws attention to the
excessive delays in Benin of: i) the implementation of loan agreements owing to their late
ratification, ii) procurements owing to inadequate compliance with the relevant Bank rules of
procedure. With regards to procurement related delays, the delays
observed are at two levels: i) bid analysis until the award of contracts; and ii) the Bank’s
notice of non-objection until the signing of the contracts. Regarding bid analysis, since 2005
Benin had been trying to solve the problem by cutting down from 15 to 8 the number of the
members of the ad hoc contract award committee, which comprised at least 7 different
Government services. Such a context does not make for efficiency in decision making. *After
the Bank’s notice of non-objection to the bid analysis and approval of the draft contract, Government procurements in Benin require 7 signatures, including those of the two ministers. The report recommended that the Government should
reduce the number of signatories and the contract signing time, which should not exceed one
month after the Bank’s approval.
*This entry will be updated once Benin's procurement procedures have been analysed by Senca
Whilst Training on the Bank’s procurement and disbursement rules and procedures was organized for members of the Unit during Bank launching and supervision missions; one of the major weaknesses noted in project implementation included a poor mastery of Bank rules and procedures. The technical assistance of a consulting engineering firm was enlisted to support the Unit in procurement readiness, validation of technical studies, works control and supervision. The report also notes: "The Bank’s supervision teams comprised an electrical engineer and a financial analyst. Participation of other Bank specialists in these missions, from time to time, especially in procurement or financial management, would have been very useful."
Most of the equipment procured under the project is commonly used by STEG. The technical specifications of the equipment were well known and clearly defined even before the appraisal. The Bank’s administrative and bidding procedures were used. Initially, STEG had some difficulty in mastering the Bank’s rules of procedure, which caused some delays. The report notes that 24-month delay on implementation was due, in particular, to initial difficulties the Project Implementation Unit encountered getting familiar with the procurement procedures, as well as to delays caused by some works contracting firms.
The project registered a time overrun of 183%. The major causes of delay were (a) ineffectiveness of the loan, (b) delayed selection of consultant, (c) inefficient evaluation of bids and submission of recommendations to the Bank. In this section, we focus on (c). The bidding process for the supply and installation contracts (230 kV lines, 132 kV and, 66 kV transmission lines and 230/132/66 kV substations) took 11 months. Evaluation of bids and submission of recommendation to the Bank for award of supply and installation contracts took 6 months to complete.
The considerable delay of over two years is mainly owing to the increase in the volume of work executed for the construction of MV/LV lines and sub-stations and also to the difficulties encountered in the execution of works in the mountainous regions of the Governorates of Jendouba and Kassérine. The last works planned for 1998 in these mountainous regions could not be executed on schedule owing to climatic vagaries (severe and rainy winter), difficulties of access and transportation of equipment, which was transported to the work site on donkey back.
Project implementation witnessed nine years of delay as compared to the schedule established at appraisal. Three years of the delay were due to the civil conflict. The formulation and implementation of the project took place in an environment marked by an economic crisis in 1987 and above all by the socio-political unrests that started in 1990. The security situation in the country continued to deteriorate reaching its highest point in 1994, with the genocide. Project activities were suspended in 1993 due to circumstances beyond control. Project installations sustained substantial damages to the point of representing a danger for the lives of the population. The insecurity and disorganization of ELECTROGAZ's services did not make it possible to take stock of the damages until 1996.
It was noted during the last supervision Mission that a few problems were encountered during the course of project implementation: particularly those relating to the continual observation of Bank rules and procedures for the procurement of goods and services; the delay in disbursement on the loan; and the lack of punctuality and transmission by the bank to the Executing Agency of data on the disbursements made. The impact on the schedule of these shortcomings is not quantified in the report, however the Bank’s performance on this project was rated “Partially satisfactory”.
The project was the Bank’s first operation in Guinea’s energy sector and mostly covered
the Conakry distribution networks. The project was adversely affected by the unsuccessful
implementation of the institution building component planned under the Energy II Programme
and the delay in carrying out institutional reforms. The key project objectives were not attained
owing to decisions taken in that regard. Eleven donors funded the project. Inadequate
coordination of donor participation impacted negatively on performance.
Projects under the programme were appraised separately by each donor. There was neither sufficient contact nor joint analysis of the results of project appraisal missions by the co-financiers, for which reason certain project objectives could not be met. Co-ordination in project supervision was also lacking. In all, the Bank conducted 5
supervision missions from 1994 to 1999. However, although the Bank regularly informed CIDA of the results of its
supervision missions, it never received information in return. In contrast, the Bank regularly
received copies of World Bank supervision mission reports. Supervision coordination is
indispensable during jointly-financed operations.
Project components were prepared independently and separately by respective donors within the bilateral or multilateral framework. Integration of projects at varying levels of implementation made coordination more difficult. The most striking example is the ADB-funded equipment that was received in June 1996 whereas the contractor was only mobilized in December 1996. The coordination planned for at appraisal was no longer considered necessary, and each project was implemented in line with provisions concluded with the financiers. The coordination of several project components initiated separately within differing
contexts is complicated, and the chances for success are limited.
The project was financed by 9 different funding organizations, with each organisation funding different components or sub-components of the project. There were delays on different components of the project ranging from 2-5 years. The Bank financed component was the last to be completed, as a result, the Bank financed component was considerably delayed by earlier delays. The report notes that there was a lack of coordination and consultation between the co-financiers. For instance, it is noted that the CDC contemplated conditionalities related to sharing of Kariba South assets between Zambia and Zimbabwe which could not be fulfilled and resulted in cancellation of its loan. The lack of coordination among the co-financiers during implementation resulted in a situation where each component of the project was treated as an independent project - an inefficient approach.
Some of the contracts on the project suffered delays using the Bank’s letter of credit procedure. The executing agency reported that due to above delay, three consignments remained uncleared at Assab port (Eriteria). The mode of payment by the letter of credit requires a lengthy process, which delayed the supply of materials and the completion of the project. Further, according to the Bank’s regulation, the minimum possible amount for opening a letter of credit is UA 200,000. The executing agency faced difficulties in effecting payment to the contractor for the supply of street light materials because the amount to be paid was less than UA 200,000.
During implementation the project was not modified in scope. However, from a technical standpoint the design of the towers for the 225 kV lines had to modified to adapt them to the specific conditions of the routing lines. The type of pylon suggested at appraisal had to be replaced by a new type of metal tetrapod pylon in some of the regions. This change was made as these poles where better suited to the mountainous regions and other regions with very high saline pollution. This pivot could have been avoided. The study to create the metal pylons brought about a delay of 9-months. The report also notes that the implementation schedule of the major works was too ambitious. Not only were technical specificities overlooked, the plan did not take into account the fact that the majority of the 225kV and 60kV lines were to be constructed in very difficult mountain terrain.
During project implementation there were substantial modifications to the project components. For instance, following the completion of the Transmission Network Development study by an international consultant, a modified and much larger set of transmission lines and substations was identified to fully utilize the additional 500 MW power supply Zimbabwe was likely to get by interconnection from Mozambique. Some of the transmission lines previously identified would have become redundant after the above connection was made so they were cancelled. It became evident that the Initial bank loan was insufficient for the revised scope of the transmission system.
In all, 592 km of transmission lines were constructed under the project, which was quite close to the originally planned lines but the configuration of the lines had substantially altered. The initially envisaged project component “Rehabilitation of Kariba South Hydropower Station” could not be undertaken within the project as the Borrower could not fulfill the one of CDC’s conditions for their loan.
The project did not undergo any technical modifications in relation to the initial design. However,
the lengths of the MV and LV lines and the number of MV and LV sub-stations largely exceeded the
estimates made at appraisal. The lengths of the MV and LV lines and the
number of MV/LV sub-stations constructed practically doubled in relation to the estimates made
at appraisal because the villages and rural accommodations connected under the project were in large
part isolated, scattered and distant from the existing electrical network.
The initial project implementation schedule envisaged implementation over a period of four (4)
years, from the 1st quarter of 1993 to June 1997. The period was largely exceeded because the last works
executed under the project were completed only in September 1999. This considerable delay of over two
years is mainly owing to the increase in the volume of work executed for the construction of MV/LV lines
and sub-stations and also to the difficulties encountered in the execution of works in the mountainous
regions of the Governorates of Jendouba and Kassérine. The last works planned for 1998 in these
mountainous regions could not be executed on schedule owing to climatic vagaries (severe and rainy
winter), difficulties of access and transportation of equipment, which was transported to the work site on
donkey backs only from March 1999.
Operational performance during execution was hampered by technical planning that did not take into account: revision of the staking outs to respect the rights of way of the road network; taking the new projects into account in the construction of roads; difficulty and sometimes temporary impossibility of access to certain sites owing to the rise in the water level during and after the rainy season; and the crossing of the lines in the areas prone to flooding.
Three notable modifications were made to the technical aspects of the project: changes in the cable chosen for a key line; the digging of special foundations needed to cross certain areas prone to flooding, placing metal jacket poles in substitution of reinforced concrete poles and the adoption of the insulated 50 mm copper cable instead of the 75.5 mm almelec cable; and lastly, an increase in the number of supports installed on the MV lines’s ‘long spans”. The modifications were approved by the Bank and assisted in guaranteeing a larger volume of electric power to the electrified localities and strengthened the resilience of the infrastructure.
The report notes that part of the delays in project implementation can be attributed to the "unavailability of certain technical and economic studies".
For instance, the equipment that was to be procured was for routine
use at SBEE (the Executing agency and local electricity authority) and the relevant technical
specifications were well known. The
expenditure categories were defined in
the appraisal report and in the Loan
Agreement, as were the procurement
methods. However, only quantities of
equipment necessary for the
electrification of 30 out of the 57
project areas were defined at
appraisal. Furthermore, the project had planned to source wooden poles from SBEE who would help create a processing plant for these poles. However the installation
of the wooden poles processing plant and studies to guarantee its technical
feasibility and economic viability had
not been conducted at appraisal. An economic feasibility study was
later conducted with a view to setting up the plant. The study revealed that the tree species needed to viably
support this activity were not available in sufficient quantities in Benin, hence this
component was abandoned.
The project was carried out over a period of six (6) years from June 1999 to end of June 2005. It was completed with two-and-a-half years delay in relation to the time schedule established at appraisal. The delay may be attributed to: i) the updating of the schedule of benchmark contract prices which required the launch of tenders on similar works; ii) approval of the list of villages by the National Rural Electrification Commission, which meets twice a year; iii) increase in project quantities; iv) elasticity of demand for connections, and v) the mobility of the members of the project unit. The increase in project quantities (iii) was caused by an increase in demand which the analysis failed to identify. This significantly increased the length of the MV and LV lines necessary for reaching all subscribers, often in areas far removed from the existing network. The same applied to the number of MV/LV transformers installed and LV substations. The total number of connections made exceeded the estimates by 16.8 %. With regards to iv, this too could have been identified during economic studies. In short, the demand for connections in some areas was not as expected partly due to the irregularity of the incomes of some beneficiaries.
At appraisal the project was to be implemented over a period of 33-months, it was implemented over a period of 57-months. The main reasons given for the delay were a 9-month delay due to a study for a new type of metal pylon and issues relating to contractors. With regards to the contractors there were two issues: first, the implementing agency was forced to put in place a new contract for the supply of machine string for the manufacturing of conductors for the 225kV and 60kV lines due to the failure of the initial supplier, who made deliveries that did not conform to technical specifications - this delay was prolonged by the process in establishing a new buyer credit agreement concerning the supplies. The first set of conductors was delivered 10 months after the expected date. The second issue was in the form of enterprises that had been awarded contracts for the execution of work on the 225kV lines. Two of these contractors went into default. Requiring that their contracts be reattributed on the basis of bidding results to a group of enterprises already working on similar packages.
The project was executed in 2 phases. Part of the delays during Phase II were caused by replacing the cables which had been supplied from an ineligible source by the main contractor. The report also notes that some of the other contractors also had lapses in the quality of service, for example, some of the items supplied by M/S Kolon of South Korea had deviated from specifications.
There were, incidents of oversight that contributed to implementation delays on the project. For instance, there were inadequate contingency measures in regard to NOR-ICIL’s problem of not meeting completion time targets. This contractor in particular had difficulty in meeting overall as well as revised monthly targets in the construction of 33 kV lines. There were delays in meeting the schedule by one supplier for nails and caps, and extra wood poles.
The project registered a time overrun of 183%. Contractor related delays caused time overruns between 3.5 to 6-months. Contractors involved with the establishment of the substations, the head lines and the transmission lines all registered significant delays in their implementation. The delays were caused by a number of issues, including: delay in submission of designs, delays in equipment and supplies delivery and recruitment of key personnel. The report notes that many of the contractor delays and the nature of the delays indicate that they were within the control of the borrower /executing agency and were avoidable.
Project objectives were achieved within the allocated financial and human resources. In fact, savings (UA 4.68 million) were realized on completion of the project from both sides Ethiopia and Djibouti. However, the objectives of the project were achieved with ten (10) months implementation delays from the re-appraisal schedule. The report notes that the “Poor performance of transmission and substation contractors contributed to implementation delays”.
On this project, international firms handled both the engineering consultancy roles and the contracts for works. Both sets of parties contributed to the delayed implementation of the project. The contract for engineering consultancy services was awarded to Lahmeyer
International (Germany). The services of the consultant involved (i) preparation of detailed
engineering design and tender documents, (ii) construction supervision, and (iii) training of EdM’s
technical staff. It is found that (i) the quality of design was not good, (ii) the manning schedule was
weak to include experts of relevant disciplines and sufficient man-months to undertake the
assignment. The consultant failed to provide adequate guidance to the contractors, which led to
unnecessary complaints, construction delays and disputes/claims. The consultant also failed to
enforce the contractual obligations of the contractors. Consequently, the overall performance of
the consultant was rated not satisfactory.
Contracts for works were awarded in two packages. The contract for transmission line
and substation (Package 1) was awarded to ISOLUX WAT (Spain) and the contract for
distribution networks (Package 2) was awarded to ABB Substations (Sweden). The quality of
works of both contractors was good, and all the facilities constructed were successfully
commissioned and are functioning without any problem. However, Packages 1 and 2 were
commissioned with 16 months and 24 months delay respectively when compared to the period
specified in the contracts. Although part of the delay was caused by the time taken for custom
clearance due to the introduction of new custom clearance procedure, lack of proper planning by
contractors also contributed to late completion of the packages. Overall, the performance
of both contractors was considered satisfactory.
The project's revised implementation period was changed to 2005-2007 to accommodate the delay in start-up. This new implementation schedule was not adhered to since the works were completed only in 2010. This delay was due, in particular, to initial difficulties the Project Implementation Unit encountered getting familiar with the procurement procedures, as well as to delays caused by some works contracting firms. No further details on the delays of the contracting firms were given in the report.
At appraisal the project was to be implemented over a period of 33-months, it was implemented over a period of 57-months. The main reasons given for the delay were a 9-month delay due to a study for a new type of metal pylon and issues relating to contractors. With regards to the contractors there were two issues: first, the implementing agency was forced to put in place a new contract for the supply of machine string for the manufacturing of conductors for the 225kV and 60kV lines due to the failure of the initial supplier, who made deliveries that did not conform to technical specifications - this delay was prolonged by the process in establishing a new buyer credit agreement concerning the supplies. The first set of conductors was delivered 10 months after the expected date. The second issue was in the form of enterprises that had been awarded contracts for the execution of work on the 225kV lines. Two of these contractors went into default. Requiring that their contracts be reattributed on the basis of bidding results to a group of enterprises already working on similar packages.
The project registered a time overrun of 183%. Contractor related delays caused time overruns between 3.5 to 6-months. One delay has been attributed to the contractor running out of resources. This contractor was responsible for the construction of the staff housing at Alamata, Mekele, Adigrat, and Adwa. The contractor failed to complete dwellings. Consequently, the contractor was expelled from the site on April 29, 1998. The EEPCO (Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation) would later take on the responsibility to complete the unfinished works.
The project was executed in 2 phases. The performance of most of the manufacturers and suppliers was satisfactory. However, some delays were caused by a change in sub-contractor, for instance the subcontractors for the supply of materials (cables), was changed during implementation.
The project registered a time overrun of 183%. Numerous reasons are provided for the delay, in this section we focus on those related to the executing agency’s inefficiency during the bidding process. First, the start of the bidding process for the supply and installation contracts of transmission lines and substations was delayed 11 months. The evaluation of bids and submission of recommendations to the Bank for award of supply and installation contracts then took 6 months, with the exception of contract B (for the 132kV transmission line) which was late by approximately 10 months.
The project suffered implementation delays due to long time taken in (i) declaring the loan effective (16 months after loan approval as opposed to 6 months envisage at appraisal), which affected the appointment of the Engineering Consultant (contract award 18 months after approval as opposed to 4 months planned at appraisal); (ii) tendering process for the award of contract for works (12 months as opposed to 5 months planned at appraisal); and (iii) the construction of the works (45 months as opposed to 20 months). The Engineering Consultant prepared the Bid Documents in 5 months, in line with the plan envisaged at appraisal. The award of contracts for works took 11 to 12 months after the Bids were floated as opposed to 6 months envisaged at appraisal. The works as planned at appraisal were to be completed in October 2000. However, the project was completed in December 2003, with the overall implementation delay of 38 months.
It was also noted that submission of disbursement requests to the Bank took 3-6 months after submission of contractors/consultants invoices. It is also noted that the delay was experienced due to the long time taken in processing approvals of Disbursement Requests within the country (between EdM and the Bank of Mozambique).
The project was implemented 24 months behind schedule due to delay in carrying out the institutional reform and the late approval of the supply and contracting firm’s contract.
At the operational level, the project performance was mixed. The project’s technical achievements were deemed satisfactory. In contrast, general project management fell short of expectations.
The project overall was rated as unsatisfactory owing to the non-attainment of objectives at the operational and financial level, the delay in implementation and the uncertainty of sustaining project achievements at the technical and financial level.
Details on why the supply and contracting firms contracts were delayed are not given. However, the report does note that “The project as initially approved by the Bank was considerably modified during the implementation phase. Contrary to appraisal provisions, it was implemented by a contracting firm and not on force account by the executing agency, with attendant significant financial impact”.
The project was executed in 60 months compared to the 29 anticipated. With regards to the duration of project implementation, it is worth noting that the deadlines for the execution of the various contracts were respected, and the rehabilitation and LT network extension works were even completed before schedule. Project implementation took longer than anticipated, owing to the difficulty in finding a training center for the accounts officials and delays in processing the acquisition of works and services. With regards to the acquisition process, the main difficulties encountered in the acquisition process were, in the case of the works contract and PIU, due to the use of non-standard tender dossiers whose adaptation led to delays. These difficulties were heightened by the Executing Agency’s lack of exposure to the Bank’s rules. They led to delays in the launch of tenders and finalization of the contracts. Furthermore, the acquisition process was handicapped by EMAE’s long approval delays of the reports on the appraisal of offers.
The project was executed in 60 months compared to the 29 anticipated. With regards to the duration of project implementation, it is worth noting that the deadlines for the execution of the various contracts were respected, and the rehabilitation and LT network extension works were even completed before schedule. Project implementation took longer than anticipated, owing to the difficulty in finding a training center for the accounts officials and delays in processing the acquisition of works and services. With regards to the training issue: Tenders on the basis of a shortlist of training centers were unsuccessful since the training centers were used to direct enrollment and were not familiar with the preparation of bid dossiers. Selection on the basis of proposal of services or direct negotiation proved to be the most appropriate way of ensuring training in the project framework. After an unsuccessful consultation of training centers on the basis of the Bank’s shortlist, the Borrower entered directly into negotiation, after the Bank’s authorization, with the African Centre for High Management Studies (CESAG) to conclude the training contract.
At appraisal, the project was to be implemented over a period of 33 months, in actuality it took 40-months to complete. The main delays can be attributed to the i) the lengthy implementation of loan agreements owing to their late ratification, ii) procurements owing to inadequate compliance with the relevant Bank rules of procedure. However, the report also notes that SBEE (the implementing agency) had difficulties providing certain types of concrete supports in time. Thus the initial contract plan could not be respected and certain parts of the structures could not be completed at the end of the works contract date of 18 December 2004.
On this project, the implementation schedule was delayed by 29-months. Whilst there were numerous reasons for the delay, key to this section is that SBEE (Benin Power Utility Company) had difficulties providing certain types of concrete supports in time. SBEE’s inability to deliver reinforced concrete poles (RCP) in time, thus affected project implementation and causing additional delays in works.
The project registered a time overrun of 183%. Numerous reasons are provided for the delay, in this section we focus on those related to the executing agency’s inability to effectively coordinate the implementation parties. One example is given with regards to work on contract B which concerned the transmission lines: At EEPCO’s instructions, the contractor produced towers based on the preliminary 132 kV transmission lines surveys. Later, the check surveys done by the contractor revealed the towers produced by the contractor were far greater than the requirements for construction of lines. Utilising some of the extra towers produced by the contractor, EEPCO constructed an additional line from Mekele-Massobo (5 km) to supply power (up to 20 MW) to a cement factory using their own funds.
Implementation on this project was severely delayed, much of the delay is attributed to the conflict in Rwanda. However, the project report also notes that "works were slowed down, and even suspended due to problems of tax exemption, delay in settling bills, difficulties in expropriation, lack of cooperation and coordination between the operators, including the representatives of the project owner and the executing agency." The report also notes that, even with the conflict "The implementation timetable could have been reduced or at least met but for the lack of cooperation between the participants and the poor organization of the civil service." The nature of the lack of coordination is not provided in the report.